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[L. A. No. 18968. In Bank. Dee. 5, 1944.]

LILLIAN CANDACE HOUSE, Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
[1] Eminent Domain - Police Power Distinguished. - While the
police power is very broad in concept, it is Dot without restriction in relation to the taking 01" damaging of property.
[1] See 10 OaLJur. 283; 18 Am.Jur. 639.

IIcJL Dig. Beferences: [1,3,4, 6J Eminent Domain,
Watera, 1593.
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When it passes beyond proper bounds in its invasion of property rights, it comes within the purview of the law of eminent
domain and it~ e:x-erci!le requires compensation.
[2a-2c] Waters - Flood Control Districts - Liability for Flood
Damage.-A flood control district may not escape liability for
flood dama~e on any theory of e~erci!;jng a riparian tight if
it has removed safe an,d secure 'protection immedilltely adjacent to the owner's land and substituted therefor an unsafe.
careless and negligently planned bank or wall, resulting in the
overflow, inundating ,and washing away of her' property. and
a complaint so alleging states a cause of action within Con!lt.,
art I, § 14.
[8) Eminent Domain - Police Power Distinguished. - A governmental agency proceeding with work on a public improvement,
undertaken in the exercise of the police power, may not needlessly inflict injury on private property without bein~ liahle
to make compensation therefor. This principle accords with
the general object of the constitutional guaranties in protection of property ri/!,hts, and places on a reciprocal basis the
individual's damage in relation to the public benefit.
[4] ld.-Police Power Distinguished.-Under the pressure of public
necessity and to avert impending peril. the le¢timate exercise
of the police power often works not only avoidable damage bllt
destruction of property without calling for compensation.
and in such cases the emergency constitutes full justification
for the measures taken to control the menacing condition.
[5] Waters - Flood Control Districts - Liability - Damage from
Construction of lmprovement.-While mere errors of judgment.
in planning and constructing a public work, such as flood control work, may be consistent with reasonable care, a procedure
so grossly incompetent and contrary to "good engineerin/!,
practices" as to constitute negligence may give the injured
property owner just cause' for complaint on the ground that
the governmental agency responsible for the project has transgressed the limits of the police power. Such conclusion does
not make the public agency an insurer against all possible
damage which thereby might be inflicted on private property,
but merely requires that the damage to the individual not
exceed the neeessities of the particular case. '
[6] Eminent Domain - Pollee Power Distinguisbed.-In view of
the organic rights to acquire, possess and prote"t property,
and to due process and equal protection of the law.s, the principles of non liability and damnftm absque injuria are not ap-

[4] See 18 Am.Jm. 778•
•
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plicable when, in the excrcil;e of the police power, personal
and property rights are interfrred with or impaired in a manner or to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to serve
a public purpose' for the g"e'nrraJ welfare.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, Judge. Reversed.
Action against flood control district for damages for injuries to land as a result of flooding. Judgment of dismissal
after sustaining demurrer to complaint without leave to
amend, reversed.
Henry M. Lee for Appellant.
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, and S. V. O. Prichard,
Assistant County Counsel, for Respondent.
CURTIN, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court had sustained a demurrer
to the plaintiff's first amended complaint without leave to
amend.
The plaintiff, as the owner of certain land in Los Angeles
County adjacent to the Los AngeleS River, undertakes to state '
a cause of action based upon damages to her property by
reason of the negligence of the defendant district in its planning, construction and maintenance of certain flood control
channel work in said river. She rests her right of recovery
upon article I, section 14, of the state Constitution, which
provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation to the owner. The
trial court erred in failing to sustain the constitutional basis
of the plaintiff's claim under the distinguishable concept of
her pleading.
As appears from the amended complaint, the gist of the
plaintiff's case is as follows: In pursuance of its plan for
flood control, the Los Angeles County Flood Control District
removed permeable dikes, piling, wire mesh and groins that
bordered the Los Angeles River adjacent to the plaintiff's
land and replaced these installations with levees. The effect
of the dikes and other obstructions had been to reduce the
high velocity of the river waters in flood season by permitting
~ to spread over an extensive overflow area, leaving & de- .
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posit of silt thereon. Upon the removal of these protective
structures and the substitution of the levees along the river
banks, the regimen of the stream \vas completely changed in
that there was no provision for overflow spread on adjoining
lands, with the result that the waters were confined to a
smaller area and their velocity was greatly increased. The
plaintiff charges the dcfenoant district with negligence in
these principal particulars in the planning and erection of
the newly installed flood control works: (1) in failing to make
the artificial river channel of sufficient size to accommodate
the augmented volume of waters in flood seasonj and (2) in
building the levees of improper materials-sand and gravel
upon which were piled small stone blocks of inadequate size,
without being bonded together with cement, grout or other
substance-so that they were unable to withstand the erosive
force of the river waters. The plaintiff then alleges that as
the proximate result of these negligent acts, the storm waters
flowing in the Los Angeles River on March 2, 3 and 4, 1938,
broke through the levees and burst with great violence upon
her adjacent land, denuding it of its soil to a depth of from
six to ten feet and washing away all the improvements situate
thereon, to her damage in the sum of $30,663. The plaintiff
further avers that the defendant district's undertaking of
such public improvement work was not occasioned by such imminent peril or emergency in relation to the general welfare
as would excuse it from taking proper measures in the course
of construction-during the years of 1935, 1936 and 1937-to
safeguard her property from the danger attendant upon its
pursuit of a flood control plan contrary to good engineering
practices, and its installation and maintenance of defective
structures following the removal of the protective agencies
that had theretofore existed along the river banks. In this
connection the plainti1r allgees that she suffered no damage to
her property during the great flood of the Los Angeles River
in January, 1934.
It would serve no useful purpose to engage here in a detailed discussion of the opposing arguments as to whether
under the above mentioned constitutional provision a public
agency in the installation of river channel improvements is
generally liable to the property owner for overflow damage
incident to th~ exercise of such governmental function. The
divergent views on that unqualified proposition were fully
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reviewed by this court recently ill the cases of Archer v. City
of Los Angcles (1941), 19 Ca1.2d 19 [119 P.2d ] 1 and O'JIara
v. Los Angeles C01infy Flood Control Dist. (1941). I!) Ca1.2d
61 [119 P.2d 23J. While the latter case involved the same
flood control project as is now subject of complnint and under
the prevailing view there, the varying claims of damage were
held to be noncompensable upon distinguishable theories, the
liability feature here arises under a different aspect. By her
pleading the plaintiff advances, in the nature of a limitation
upon a public agency's performance of its governmental function, the charge of negligence. an added feature which did not
enter into the O'Hara decision. Accepting the premise of argument of the parties here t.hat a levee improvement made in
the channel of a stream for the general welfare is referable
to the police power, the propriety of its exercise must still
be considered under the distinct circumstances presented.
[1] While the police power is very broad in concept, it is not
without restriction in relation to the taking or damaging of
property. When it passes beyond proper bounds in its invasion of property rights, it in effect comes within the purview
of the law of eminent domain Ilnd its exercise requires compensation. (Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318 [100 P.
867, 132 Am.St.Rep. 88, 2] L.R.A.N.S. 741]; Pacific Telephone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119. Ann.
Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.A.N.S. 652],) In fact, on the point
of· a governmental agency's liability for damages arising in
connection with its undertaking construction work, the prevailing opinion in the Archer case, supra, does not purport to
dispute the settled principle that public necessity limits the
right to exact uncompensated submission from the property
owner if his property be either damaged, taken or destroyed.
Rather it is expressly stated there in the prevailing opinion
(19 Ca1.2d 23-24): "The state or its subdivisions ma~' take
or damage private property without compensation if such
action is essential to safeguard public health, safety or morals.
[citing authorities.] In certain circumstances, however, the
taking or damaging of private property for such a purpose is
not prompted by so great a necessity as to be iustified without
proper compensation to the owner. [citing authorities.]"
(Italics added.) Thus there is recognized the incontestable proposition that the exercise of the police power, though
an essential attribute of sovereignty for the public welfare
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and arbitrary in its nature, cannot extend beyond the necessities of the case and be made a cloak to destroy constitutional
rights as to the inviolateness of private property.
A case closely in point here is Pacific Seaside Home v. Newbert P. District, 190 Cal. 544 [213 P. 967], where the sufficiency of the plaintiti's pleading was likewise under attack.
There this court said at pages 545-546: " .•• The defendant
was a pubiic corporation . • . entitled to maintain and defend actions in law and in equity ... and would be liable
for the negligent diversion of storm waters upon the plaintiti's property. (Elliott v. County of Los A11geles, 183 Cal.
472, 475 [191 P.899].) The gist of the pla.intiff's complaint
is that the defendant const"ucted channels for the water of
the Santa Ana River so defectively and negligently that they
would not carry the waters of the stream. Plaintiff alleges that
'had the defendant not changed the natural course of the
Santa Ana River, or in anywise interfered with its natural
flow, the waters of the Santa Ana River would have flowed on
into Newport Bay and no damage would have accrued to the
plaintiti had the said river been permitted to flow as it naturally would had not the defendant constructed its channel
to divert the same.•. .' It is further alleged in effect that
the injury occurred to the plaintiff by reason of the fact that
the defendant negligently turned the waters of the Santa .Ana
River in a channel which was too small, and which was negligently constructed and maintained, and that by reaSOn thereof
it was damaged.
"These facts sufficiently state a cause of action." (Italics
added.)
The Elliott and Pacific Seaside Home eases were cited as
the basis for upholding the sufficiency of the plaintitis' complaint against a general demurrer in the first appellate consideration of the damage cl~im presented in Archer v. City of Los
Angeles, 15 Cal.App.2d 520 [59 P.2d 605]. The pleading was
described by the District Court of Appeal as follows at pages
521-522: "The gist of [the] ••• complaint .•• is that respondent constructed and built an artificial drainage system
so defectively, carelessly and negligently that it would not
carry the storm waters to- the Pacific Ocean as designed and
intended" and "that the injury to the appellants occurred by
reason of the fact that respondent negligently turned the
storm waters into La Ballona lagoon, which was too small to
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conduct the water turned into it hy and througlJ the draina;!:p.
system constructed, operated and maintained b;r respOIHlent .
. . . " Suhsequently, the Arrher damage action was before
this court for decision upon the appeal from the juugmcnt of
nonsuit entered at the close of the jJlaint itTs' evidence at the
trial. (Archer v. City of Lo:~ Angeles, S1lpra, 19 Ca1.2d 19.)
In the prevailing opinion affirming the judgment, the follow.
ing distinction. after quotation of the ahove portion of the
decision of tIle District Court of Appcal on demurrer, was
made at page 29: "According to the allegations of the complaint, the damagc resulted because defendants negligently
diverted water out of its natural channel, and obstructed the
channel of the creek. Plaintiffs' evidence, however, fails to
subst.antiate such allegations. 1'he decision of the District
Court of Appeal on demurrer is therefore not binding on this
court in passing on the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the allegations." (Italics added.) Measured by its own
limitation, such language, denoting the deficiency in the plaintiffs' establishment of their case, does not mean that a governmental agency in the installation of stream improvements
may escape liability under the constitutional compensation
requirement where the property owner sustaining damage
from such work proves, in accordance with his allegations,
negligence in the construction and maintenance of the public
project. Under the accepted circumstances there, the prevailing opinion in the Archer case applied the doctrine of damnum
absque injuria by declaring that the governmental agency was
exercising a riparian right so that it would be no more liable
to a lower property owner damaged thereby than would a
private person inflicting a like injury in protection of his
upper lands. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 24;
cf. O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., supra,
at p. 63.)
[2&] In the present case the defendant district may not
escape liability on any theory of exercising a riparian right,
for the plaintiff does not correlate her damage claim with any
such principle. Rather she makes the direct charge that t'fie
defendant district removed a safe and secure protection to
her land immediately adjacent thereto and substituted therefor an unsafe, carelessly and negligently planned bank or wall,
resulting in the overflow, inundating and washing away of
her propeny, which had theretofore never been visited bl the

J

)

Dec. 1944]

HOUSE 1.1.

L. A. COUNTY

FLOOD CONTROL

DIST. . .

[25 C.2d 384; 153 P.2d 950J

river waters. [3] It is a principle of universal law that
wherever the right to own property is recognized in a free
government, practically all other rights become worthless if
the government possesses an uncontrollable power over the
propcrty of the citizen. Upon this premise the plaintiff relics
on the unnecessary damage to her property as the result of the
defendant district's negligence in the planning, construction
and maintcnance of the flood channel work to sustain the constitutional basis of her claim. In other words, it is her position that damage suffered by a property owner as the result
of a public improvement undertaken in the exercis of the
police power must have some reasonable relation to the purpose to be accomplished under the prevailing circumstances,
and that the governmental agency proceeding with such work
may not needlessly inflict injury upon private property without being liable to make compensation therefor. This accords
with the general object of the constitutional guaranties in
protection of property rights and but places upon a reciprocal
basis the individual's damage in relation to the public benefit.
Unnecessary damage to his property is of no benefit to the
public; rather it only entails unwarranted sacrifice and loss
on the individual's part, which should be compensable damage.
[4] Unquestionably, under the pressure of public necessity
and to avert impending peril, the legitimate exercise of the
police power often works not only avoidable damage but destruction of property without calling for compensation. Instances of this character are the demolition of all or parts of
buildings to prevent the spread of conflagration, or the destruction of diseased animals, of rotten fruit, or infected
trees where life or health is jeopardized. In such cases calling for ::nmediate action the emergency constitutes full justification for the measures taken to control the menacing condition, and private interests must be held wholly subservient
to the right of the state to proceed in such manner as it deems
appropriate for the protection of the public health or safety.
(18 Am.Jur 778; 29 C.J.S. 784.)
[2b] But the present
case does not appear to be one of such emergency character
as would preclude the defendant district from being held
liable for unnecessary damage resulting from the alleged inadequate and negligent planning, construction and maintenance of its flood channel project. According to the plaintil1"s pleading, the defendant district, with time to exercise
a deliberate choice of action in the manner of its installation
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of the river improvements, followed a plan "inherently
wrong" and then'by caused needless damage to lier property.
_.[5] While mere errors of judgment in planning and· constructing a public work may be consistent with reasonable
care, procedure so grossly incompetent and contrary to "good
engineering practices" as to constitute negligence may well
g-ive the injured property owner just cause for complaint
upon the ground that the governmental agency responsible
for the project has transgressed the limits of the police power.
(Kaufman v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19 [280 P. 130].) Such conclusion does not make the public agency, in undertaking its
flood control program, an insurer against all possible damage
which thereby might be inflicted on private property (cf.
United States v. Sponenoarger, 308 U.S. 256 [60 S.Ct. 225,
84 L.Ed.230], but it merely requires that the damage to the
individual, on whom the sovereign power justifiably makes
demands in the public interest, not exceed the necessities ofthe particular case due to a failure to use reasonable care
and diligence. [6] In view of the organic rights to acquire,
possess and protect property and to due process and equal
protection of the laws, the principles of nonliability and
damnum absque injuria are not applicable when, in the exercise of the police power, private, personal and property rights
are interfered with, injured or impaired in a manner or by
a means, or to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to
serve a public purpose for the general welfare. (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 [43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed.
322] ; cited with approval in Archer v. City of Los Angeles,
supra, at p. 24.)
[2c] For the foregoing reasons the defendant district's
exercise of the police power does not of itself furnish complete justification for the infliction of damage upon the plaintiff's property without liability fOJ compensation. Under the
theory of her pleading, the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action within the scope of article I,
section 14. of the state Constitution, and it was prror for the
trial court to rule otherwise. The judgment of dismissal is
therefore reversed.
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the foregoing judgment and
opinion. The distinction made in the opinion between this
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case and the cases of Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941),
19 Ca1.2d 19 [119 P.2d 1], and O'Hara v. Dos Angeles County
Flood Control Dist. (1941),19 Ca1.2d 61 [119 P.2d 23], seems
tenable, but by my concurrence herein I do not imply accord
with the majority views expressed in those cases.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. Since this is
an appeal from a judgment following an order sustaining a
demurrer, the following allegations of the first amended complaint must be regarded as true. The Los Angeles River,
which becomes a menace to the neighboring property during
the rainy season because of its violent floods, overflowed
plaintiff's land during a storm in the first days of March,
1938, washed out the land to a depth of approximately six to
ten feet, and destroyed buildings, other improvements, and
personal property. The injury was caused by a system of
flood control installed by defendant in the period between
December, 1935, and the storm. The plaintiff's property would
have been protected from the flood, as it was in January,
1934. during an even greater flood, had the defendant not
replaced the former system of flood control, installed by defendant between 1917 and 1930, with new structures that
were inadequate for the purpose. The former installations
consisted of permeable dikes of piling and wire mesh along
the margin of the river bed through which the waters could
freely flow into an overflow area on both sides of the river
channel. These structures and the riparian vegetation reduced the "elocity of the flood waters. rendering them less
dangerous to neighboring property. Groins installed transversely to the overflow area 8('complished the restoration and
maintenance of the natural condition of the river by causing
a regrowth of vegetation in the overflow area and the building
up of that area with silt deposited by the water. The
new construction work. mainly excavation of the river channel and installation of levees along its banks, necessitated
removal of the shrubs and trees along the river. The channel
was narrowed and its capacity to carry water lowered. while
the velocity of the water through the channel was increased.
Since the levees lacked adequate openings to permit the drainage waters to flow into the river, the danger to the adjacent
land from overflowing water was intensified. The levees were
built several feet above the level of the riparian area and
were thus exposed to great pressure by the wat.er compressed
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into the narrowed channel. They were constructed of sand
and gravel upon which small stone blocks were laid. on the
inner slopes not bound together with cement or other material.
AB a consequence of this defective construction of the levees,
upon which the adjacent land depended for its protection, the
water could flow through the holes between the stone blocks
and percolate through the levees. Thus, the invasion of plain.
tiff's land by the flood water was caused by the defectiveness
of defendant's structures, which diverted the water out of its
natural channel onto the plaintiff's land. For the damages
sustained, plaintiff seeks compensation from defendant under
article I, section 14 of the California Constitution, providing
that private property shall "not he taken or damaged for public use" without just compensation.
Defendant contends that plaintiff is seeking to revive an
issue settled in Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19
[119 P.2d 1], and in O'Hara v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood
Oontrol Dist .. 19 Ca1.2d 61 (119 P.2d 23]. The Archer case
involved the question whether a governmental agency is liable
under article I. section 14, when improvements constructed
by it along the natural course of a stream accelerate the flow
of the water. and lower lands are flooded because of the inadequacy, known to the governmental agency, of the outlet
to accommodate the increased flow. It was held that the
governmental agency was not liable, since there is no liability under the constitutional provision if the property owner
would have no cause of action were a private person to inflict
the damage, and there would have been no cause of action
against a private person for installing improvements in the
stream accelerating the flow of the water but not diverting
it out of its channel. (8a.n Gabriel Valley Oountry Club v.
County otLos Angeles. 182 Cal. 392 [188 P. 554, 9 A.L.R.
1200].) The O'Hara case involved the same question as the
Archer case as wen as the question whether a governmental
agency is liable under thf.' constitutional provision to a property owner whose property was damaged by the obstruction
of the flow of surface water not running in a natural channel
resulting from an embankment that prevented the drainage
of surface waters into the river. In reliance on Oorcoran v.
Oity of Benicia, 96 Cal. 1 [30 P. 798, 31 Am.St.Rep. 171] ;
Oonniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45 f7 P. 41] Jefferis v. Oity
of Monterey Park, 14 Cal.App.2d 113 [57 P.2d 1347]; and
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Lampe v. San Francisco, 12-4 Cal. 546 [57 P. 46~, 1001], it
was held that in constructing the improvement, the governmental agency could validly exercise its. police power to obstruct the flow of surface waters not running in a natural
channel without making compensation for the resulting damage. The present case differs from the Archer and O'Hara
cases. In the former there was no evidence that defendants
negligently diverted water out of its natural channel. and in
the latter there was no allegation of such diversion. Here
plaintiff's allegations that the damages to her property were
caused by diversion of the water of a river out of its natnral
channel onto her land by means of defective levees causing
and allowing the water to burst out of its channel onto her
land must be regarded as true.
Defendant contends that article I, section 14, is inapplicable upon the grounds that defendant did not deliberately take
or damage plaintiff's property and did not utilize it for the
purposes of its public improvements, and that therefore the
damages--were not sustained for "public use," and were too
remote in point of· time and foreseeability to be incident to
defendant's publi(' undertaking.
Defendant is a public corporation created by an act of the
Legislature, known as the "Los Angeles Flood Control Act"
(Stats. 1915, p. 1502, as amended; Deering'S Gen. Laws, Act
4463), to protect lands, including harborS and public hi~h
ways from flood waters and to conserve the flood watel'R for
useful purposes. (§ 2 of the act; Los Angeles County Flood
Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 177 Cal. 119. 126 [169 P. 1028}.)
These purposes are essentially public although beneficial to
many private individual!'! (see Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
County Flood Control Dist., 11 Ca1.2d 395. 404 [80 P.2d 479];
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamt7ton, supra,
p. 124; Cheseboro v. Los Angeles Cou'n.ty Flood Control Dist.,
306 U.S. 459, 465 r59 S.Ct. 622, 83 L.Ed. 921]; see 29 C.J.S.
852; 70 A.L.R. 1274), and the Legislature properly vested
defendant with the power of eminent domain. (§§ 2(6), 16,
16% of the act.) Property taken or damaged for defendant's
purposes is therefore "taken or damaged for publie use" in
the sense of the constitutional provision. In the absence of
. contract the right to discharge water onto another's property
may be based on property law or on the police power of the
state. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 24.) If the
discharging of water incident to the construction of a public
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impl:ovellleHt cannot be sustained as the exercise of a right,
it is a taking or damaging within the meaning of the constitutional provision of the property llljured. (Powers [t'aJ'ms
v. C;onsolidated lrr. Vist., 19 UaUM 123, 126 [119 P.2d 717J;
Pacific Seai>ide II ome v. N ewbert P. Vist., 190 Cal. 544 l213 P.
967]; Elliott v. Vounty oj' Los -Angeles, 183 Cal. 472, 475
[191 P. 899 J; Smith v. Vity of Los Angeles, 66 Ual.App.2d
562 [153 P.2d 69J; Conniff v. San Fmncisco, 67 Cal. 45,
48[7 P. 41]; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 l54
S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142]; United States v. Oress, 243 U.S. 316,
327 [31 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746]; United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445, 470 [23 S.Ct. 349, 47 L.Ed. 539]; Hur1.ey v.
Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 [52 S.Ct. 267, 76 L.Ed. 637]; Pumpelly v. Green Bay etc. 00.,13 Wall. 166, 177 [20 L.Ed. 557] t
Eaton v. Boston etc. Railroad, 51 N.H. 504 [12 Am.Rep. 147];
see Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459; 128 A.L.R.
1195.) The destruction or damaging of property is sufficiently
connected with "public use" as required by the Constitution,
if the injury is a result of dangers inherent in the construction
of the public improvement as distinguished from dangers
arising from the negligent operation of the improvement.
The construction of the public improvement is a deliberate
action of the state or its agency iIi furtherance· of public purposes. In erecting a structure that is inherently dangerous
to private property, the state or its agency undertakes by
virtue of the constitutional provision to compensate property
owners for injury to their property arising from the inherent dangers of the public improvement or originating "from
the wrongful plan or character of the work." (Perkins v.
Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 789 [127 P. 50]; Kaufman v. Tomich,
208 Cal. 19, 25 [280 P. 130]; Powers Farms v. Oonsolidated
Irr. Dist., sup"a, p. 127; Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal.
492, 505 [6 P. 317, 56 Am.Rep. 109].) This liability is independent of intention or negligence on the part of the governmental agency. (Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, at p.
505; Tormey v. Anderson-Oottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal.App.
559 [200 P. 814], opinion of Supreme Court denying a hearing, p. 568; Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., supra,
p. 126; Mitckell v. City of Santa Barbara, 48 Cal.App.2d 568,
572 [120 P.2d 131]; Morrison v. Clackamas Oounty, 141 Ore.
564 [18 P.2d 814]; Hooker v. Farmers' Irr. Dist., 272 F. 600;
see 10 Cal.Jur. 337; 69 AL.R. 1231.) The decisive consider-
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ation is the effect of the public improvement on the property
and whether the owner of the damaged property if uncompensated would contribute more than his proper share to the
public undertaking. It is irrelevant whether or not the injury to the property is accompanied by a corresponding benefit to the public purpose to which the improvement is dedicated, since the measure of liability is not the benefit derived
from the property, but the loss to' the owner. (Rose v. State
of California, 19 Ca1.2d 713, 737 [123 P.2d 505]; City of
Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404~ [244 P. 609]; Santa
Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 542 [34 P. 224]; City of Redding
v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [59 P.2d 177] ; City of
Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Ca1.App. 21, 25 [31 P.2d
463]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Ca1.App. 512, 521
[9 P.2d 335J; see 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain § 240 et seq.)
Defendant, therefore, cannot rely on the fact that the injury
to the property was caused, not by a deliberate appropriation thereof, but by a collapse of defendant's structures. It is
of no avail to defendant that the invasion of plaintiff's property in the manner in which it happened was not forseeable.
The provision in article I, section 14, that the compensation
for the taking or damaging of property shall be paid in advance protects the interests of the property-owner where advance payment is feasible under the circumstances; liability
is not avoided simply because such payment is not feasible.
The public purpose was not the mere construction of the improvement but the protection that it would afford against
floods. The dangers inherent in the improvement would cause
injury only when storms put the flood control system to a
test. The injury sustained by plaintiff was therefore not
too remote.
According to the complaint the injury to plaintiff's land
was caused by direct invasion thereof by water bursting
through defendant's levees. Compensation for that injury
is called for under article I, section 14, if the flood waters
would not have injured her property but for the directing
of the water out of its channel onto the plaintiff's property
because of the defectiveness of the levees. By allowing the
water to leave its channel and to burst onto the plaintiff's
land, the levees diverted the water out of its natural channel.
Barring situations of immediate emergency, neither the property law nor the police power of the state entitles a governmental agency to divert water out of its natural ehannel onto
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private property. (Lat·rabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 98
[63 P. 143]; Los Angeles Cem . .I1ssn. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal.
461,467 [37 P. 375]; Conniff v. San Francisco, supra, at p. 49,
see 7 So.Cal.L.Rev. 295.)
Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I eon cur in the judgment of reversal but
I do not agree with that portion of the inajority opinion which
attempts to distinguish this case from the cases of Archer v.
City of Los Angeles, 19 Ca1.2d 19 [119 P.2d 1] j and O'Hara
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61 [119
P .2d 23 J. These last mentioned cases are not distinguishable
from the case at bar, and in my opinion, the only Bound basis
upon which the case at bar can be reversed is that stated in
my dissenting opinions in the above cited cases. In these
dissenting opinions I pointed out the patent fallacy of the
theory upon which the majority opinions in those cases was
based, and Mr. Justice Curtis concurred in those dissenting
opinions. My opinion in regard to those cases has not changed
because the views expressed in my dissenting opinions therein
were and are absolutely· sound. It now appears that a majority of this court are not satisfied with the conclusion reached
in the majority opinions in the Archer and O'Hara cases, but
instead of overruling these cases, they have attempted to distinguish them from the case at bar. I do not approve of this
practice as it merely adds to the confusion which already
exists. However, by limiting the application of the doctrine
announced in those eases, the majority opinion in the case
at bar has taken a commendable step, and I trust that the
time will come in the not distant future when a majority of
this court will have the wisdom, foresight and courage to take
the further step and expressly overrule the Archer and O'Hara
eases and thus remove the injustice and confusion which those
decisions have brought to the law of this state.
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